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PRESENTATION AT THE 1997 WILLEM C.
VIS INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION MOOT ON THE CISG
THE SPHERE OF APPLICATION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS SALES CONVENTION
Roland Loewet
INTRODUCTION
It is a pleasure for me to speak before you on the sphere of
application of the Sales Convention. Even if this pleasure is a
little diminished because my working languages always have
been German and French and not English, but I am sure that
you all will help me. My exercise will be less hard because you
have all worked on the Sales Convention and I fear that in cer-
tain aspects you know more about it than I. All that I can do is
to try a coherent summary of the sphere of application of the
CISG and perhaps provide some supplementary information on
its history and background. For doing this I have not consulted
books and articles by learned professors. I have only trusted my
memory. Since 1962 I was involved in the development of this
Convention. We are all jurists and you know that memory of
testimonies are always subjective and often wrong, so it may
happen that learned professors know better than ourselves
what we have done and why we have done so. In this case,
please forgive me.
t Professor Loewe was the Chairperson of the first committee of the Vienna
Diplomatic Conference at which the CISG was promulgated. He was also a dele-
gate at the 1964 Diplomatic Conference at which the antecedents of the CISG was
developed: The Hague Sales Convention (ULIS) and the Hague Formation Con-
vention (ULF).
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DIMENSIONS OF THE SALES CONVENTION
Everything in this world has three dimensions. It is the
same for the Sales Convention. There is a material sphere of
application, a geographical sphere of application and a temporal
sphere of application.
TEMPORAL SPHERE OF APPLICATION
The easiest is the temporal sphere of application of the
Convention. It is not retroactive. This is a principle coming from
penal law. No one should be punished if he has done something
that was not punishable at the time. In civilized countries this
principle is extended to all branches of law because this makes
foreseeable the consequences of a certain behavior. The princi-
ple of no retroactivity corresponds also to international treaty
practice. But from all principles there are exceptions. The New
York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards of 10 June 1958 is not limited to awards ren-
dered before its entry into force. You will believe that this ques-
tion is meaningless in respect of a 39 year old instrument and
you are right, but not entirely. Even after 39 years, frequently
new states accede to the New York Convention and all member
states are bound to enforce all applicable foreign arbitral
awards - including awards which were not enforceable when
they were rendered. Beyond that, the New York Convention
permits two reservations: it may be limited to commercial mat-
ters, and it may be limited to awards rendered in member
states. These reservations can be withdrawn at any moment but
if a country withdraws such a reservation, it is bound to enforce
old foreign awards which it would not have recognized before
the withdrawal. Let us come back to our subject.
Parts II and III of our Convention apply when the offer is
made on or after the date when the Convention enters into force
in respect of the two Contracting States of the places of business
of seller and buyer. Or, in the case of Article 1 par. 1 (b), a rule
which we will consider a little later, of the State whose rules of
international private law lead to the application of the law of a
Contracting State. Part III, the sales provisions, but not the for-
mation provisions of Part II, apply already if the offer was made
before this date and the conclusion of the contract takes place
thereafter. Article 23 states that the contract is concluded when
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the acceptance of the offer became effective, and Article 18 (2)
states that this moment is when the indication of assent
reaches the offeree. There are exceptions for late or modified ac-
ceptance but it would lead us too far from our subject, which is
sphere of application, if we try to go into these details.
MATERIAL SPHERE OF APPLICATION
What is a sale? The Convention does not answer this ques-
tion. We must consider common sense. A sale is an exchange of
goods against money or at least against things which are ac-
cepted by everyone instead of or in replacement of money. For
the moment I am not able to indicate such a means of payment.
The times of emergency rations seem to be passed. I remember
that in Yugoslavia before World War II, a matchbox was given
instead of half a dinar when one had no coins. The same is done
often in Italy with coins for telephones and perhaps elsewhere
with tokens for subways. These are certainly not examples to be
taken in account. Exchange of goods against other goods is bar-
ter and not a sale. Exchange of goods against services in Roman
law do ut facias, facto ut des is also considered as a barter or as
a transaction sui generis, but in no event as a sale.
What are goods? Here one needs to take into account the
history of the Convention. The early drafts in the 30s, 50s, and
60s were only in French. They identify their purpose as regulat-
ing the international sale of objets mobiliers corporels - trans-
lated literally as movable physical things. For the 1964 Hague
Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale
of Goods (ULIS), the word "goods" has been used in the English
version but in the French text, objets mobiliers corporels was
maintained. It was at the New York Conference on the 1974
Prescription Convention that the French text also was simpli-
fied to marchandises without any intention to change its mean-
ing. Goods in the sense of the 1980 Sales Convention are all
things which have volume and can be moved. It is sufficient that
they became movable at the occasion of the sale. Example given,
fruit which is still on the tree. German speaking colleagues may
be interested to know that for Germany, the German version of
ULIS spoke only about movable things because in the definition
of the German civil code all things are physical. By way of con-
trast, the Austrian civil code qualifies also rights as things of
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not physical nature. The Austrian translation followed entirely
the French objets mobiliers corporels as bewegliche Korperliche
Sachen.
Not all sales of goods are covered materially by the Conven-
tion. Article 2 contains a list of six exceptions. It is not possible
in our short time to give you details on the reasons of all these
exceptions. In general, they are motivated by the impossibility
to know really if the sale is of a national or of an international
character, or by the strong link between the sale and the terri-
tory where the sale takes place, or by the possible conflicts with
other international instruments, or finally by the nature of the
operation which is more an exchange or a barter than a sale.
The first of the mentioned exceptions concerns mainly con-
sumer sales. Imagine the case, Mrs. Okzan goes to a supermar-
ket in Vienna and she takes potatoes, celery, milk and paper for
the toilet and then she comes to pay.
The girl at the market says it comes to ATS 64.50.
Then the girl hesitates, looks to Mrs. Okzan, asks: "Are you
Austrian?"
Mrs. Okzan: "No. I am Turkish."
G: "But you live in Vienna?"
Mrs. Okzan: "No I don't live in Vienna. I live in Bayromoglu. I
visit my son only for a fortnight. He works in Vienna."
G: "But where is Bayromoglu."
Mrs. Okzan says it's near Izmit
G: "And where is Izmir?"
Mrs. Okzan: "Izmit is a town approximately 100 km east of Istan-
bul but it's not Izmir, it's another town Izmit."
Then the girl says: "I must take notice of this all because the
jurists of the supermarket will then think over if the Sales Con-
vention applies because in case of something wrong with your po-
tatoes, with your milk, with your celery or with your paper, the
market should be liable not in conformity to Austrian law but to
the Vienna Convention."
So, contrary to the Hague Convention of 1964 it was absolutely
necessary to exclude consumer sales.
Sea-going ships and vessels for inland navigation of a cer-
tain size should be registered, sometimes also aircraft. There is
a world-wide convention on the registration of sea-going ships
and a European convention for inland navigation vessels. Un-
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fortunately, these instruments are not accepted by all relevant
states and do not harmonize the conditions for registration, but
only the consequences. Nevertheless, property and other real
rights cannot be acquired otherwise than by registration. Such
rights must be in conformity with the law of the state of the
registration. The authors of the Sales Convention had three
options:
(1) subject ships and vessels and eventually aircraft to the Con-
vention at the risk that the buyer cannot obtain ownership;
(2) exclude these goods entirely;
(3) exclude only registered ships and vessels.
There are differences between the registration laws con-
cerning the size and other qualifications and information asked
of the owner in respect of nationality, domicile, residence and
other matters. What to do with ships or vessels that should be
registered but are not? What to do with those that should be
registered in two or more states? The UNCITRAL Working
Group oscillated between solutions (1) and (2). Finally, the Dip-
lomatic Conference decided to exclude these goods entirely. In
cases where jurists have to choose between alternatives and, af-
ter long consideration, one approach is chosen by a relatively
large assembly, it is quite normal that a new (smaller) group of
other lawyers, considering the same issue, will come to a con-
trary conclusion. You can find many examples of this in the
UNIDROIT Principles, but in our specific case also at the
Hague Conference of International Private Law, the 1985 Con-
vention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods (an instrument without any chance of
success). Its Article 3 expressly includes ships, vessels, boats,
Hovercraft and aircraft. At part 33 of the Explanatory Report to
this convention, Prof. von Mehren does not give any convincing
or even understandable argument for this dissenting opinion of
the Hague Conference.
A very similar situation exists for electricity. As I have ex-
plained the word "goods" was considered as a synonym for
objets mobiliers corporels: goods having a certain volume. Gas
is included in the CISG, electricity is not. It was not necessary
in the Vienna Convention to explicitly exclude the sale of elec-
tricity from the scope of the application. It was done more or
19981
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less to avoid insecurity and discussion. The said Hague Confer-
ence includes electricity for the same, or if you like, the opposite
reasons.
Mainly for two types of contracts it may be disputed if they
are contracts for the sale of goods or contracts for services. The
first type, the client supplies materials, the manufacturer pro-
duces the goods. If the client supplies all of the materials, it is
undoubtedly a contract for services. If the client supplies no ma-
terial, the transaction must be treated as a sale of goods. Where
is the limit? Article 3 par. 1 of the Sales Convention states that
it is not a sale of goods if the client supplies a "substantial part"
of the materials. This language is a bit vague. "Substantial
part" must not be the preponderant or the more valuable part,
but the value of the materials furnished by the client certainly
play a role. On the other side, the value of the service of the
production itself is outside the consideration. One should wait
to have decisions which could give guidelines.
Article 3 (2), which contains the phrase "preponderant
part," discusses the situation in which the same party furnishes
goods and supplies connected services. These situations are
very frequent when factories are to be equipped with machinery
and made ready to work. In this situation simply the more valu-
able part of the goods or services is decisive. In these cases, the
authors of the Vienna Sales Convention intended to avoid a du-
alism of regimes where one part of the contract should have
been submitted to the Convention but not the other. In reality,
nevertheless, this may create difficulties if one cannot find in
the Vienna Sales Convention a solution for a typical question
concerning service contracts. The first part of Article 7 par. 2
may not give an answer and one can be forced to apply to this
question national law which means that as a result a dualism of
regimes cannot be avoided. It is not my intention to speak in
connection with the scope of application on contracting in or
contracting out questions. But where it may be uncertain if the
Convention will apply because there may be doubts in regard to
the importance of furnished material or about the "preponder-
ant part" of goods or services, parties should foresee in their
contract the applicability or non-applicability of the Convention.
Finally, the Convention applies to all kinds of damages
which parties may cause each other but not to liability for death
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or personal injury caused by the goods. In the countries of the
European Union a directive has created common standards on
products liability. Probably the same has happened elsewhere.
The Sales Convention had no intention to enter in conflict with
these rules.
GEOGRAPHIC SPHERE OF APPLICATION
Last but not least, the geographical dimension. In the early
1930s when work on unification of sales law began, the world
was quite different. International trade was not at all so signifi-
cant as it is in our days. We in Austria imported some fruits
from certain countries - oranges, bananas - but the rest was
homemade. It was foreseeable that with better means of trans-
port this situation would be changed. At this time international
private law was not at all unified, even in most European states
it was not codified. It was only codified in Czechoslovakia, Po-
land and Yugoslavia but for quite different purposes. These
countries were created after the 1st World War in territories in
which German, Austrian, Hungarian and Russian law was in
effect. There was a need for domestic law rules of conflict which
at the beginning constitutes not yet international but inter-local
private law. And these rules later on could be used for interna-
tional purposes. As international private law was uncertain and
speculative a young organization, namely, the Institute for Uni-
fication of Private Law (UNIDROIT) in Rome, decided to pro-
duce a uniform law on international sales. The objective was
that all national sales should be regulated by national laws, and
all international sales should be regulated by one and the same
unified international law. This set of rules should be indifferent
to adherence of the states between which the sale took place.
For this purpose, it was necessary to define the geographic
dimensions of the international sales contract. Three alterna-
tive criteria were foreseen:
(1) the carriage of the goods from one state to another,
(2) offer and acceptance have been affected in different states,
(3) delivery is to be made in a state different than those of offer
and acceptance.
This definition is contained in the Uniform Law on the In-
ternational Sale of Goods (ULIS) done at The Hague in 1964,
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but states do not want a universal law applicable to transac-
tions between non-members. The 1964 Diplomatic Conference
was forced to permit three reservations concerning the geo-
graphical sphere of application of ULIS: application only if both
parties have their places of business in two different member
states; application only if rules of international private law lead
to the law if a member state; application only if the parties
agree to it. This last so-called British reservation reduces the
Uniform Law to a set of rules which - more or less exception-
ally - can be stipulated by the parties.
At the 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, the British del-
egation again sought to obtain their reservation; this time,
without success. This is a reason why Great Britain is still not a
member of the Vienna Sales Convention. Eight or nine coun-
tries ratified ULIS but since they made use of different reserva-
tions to the geographical sphere of application, it was not so
easy to establish in a given case that ULIS was to apply or not.
This was one of the major criticisms of ULIS and an obstacle for
many other states to accept it. At the second meeting of the UN-
CITRAL Working Group on the International Sales Convention,
the universality principle was replaced by the Article 1 par.
1(a); that is to say, by the application of the Convention only if
the places of business of the parties are in two different member
states. I must confess that at this meeting I was opposed to such
a radical diminution of the geographical sphere of application.
My friends, the Belgium and the Egyptian delegates and I tried
to propose common intermediary solutions but they were not ac-
cepted by the majority. As I think now, the majority was right
in selecting this approach and abandoning unsatisfactory crite-
ria such as the movement of goods over borders, the location of
the offer and the acceptance or delivery in different states.
Article 10 explains which place is to be taken into consider-
ation if a party had more than one place of business or if it has
no place of business at all. Article 10 poses no major problem.
The Convention is the law for international sales between par-
ties from member states. If the Convention is not applicable be-
cause one party or both parties have their places of business
outside the member states, national private law rules deter-
mine which law applies. It may be that the law indicated by the
rules of conflict of laws is that of a member state. Then the
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question arises if it should be the set of rules for internal or for
international commercial operations. The authors of the Con-
vention were of the opinion that it should be the latter and this
for several reasons: The Convention is published and known as
well as the national sales law. The Convention is especially con-
ceived for international affairs. For an exporter or importer, the
Convention will be a set of rules which he is accustomed to us-
ing. No party should be confronted with unknown or difficult to
discover rules of civil or commercial law. Placing a foreigner in
a worse situation because of their limited understanding of the
applicable law is unacceptable. These are the main reasons for
Article 1(1)(b) which makes the Convention also applicable
where the rules of private international law lead to the applica-
tion of the law of a Contracting State including the law of the
forum. Nevertheless a reservation to adopt the Convention
without its Article 1(1)(b) was requested and admitted. Out of
more than 40 member states only China, Czech Republic,
Slovak Republic and the U.S. have made use of this reservation.
Germany has declared that it would not apply Article
1(1)(b) in respect of any state that had made a declaration that
that state would not apply Article 1(1)(b). This is perfectly per-
missible because a state is allowed to make use of a permitted
reservation only partially. Following the rules of German inter-
national private law, the effect of the German restricted reser-
vation is that if Article 1(1)(a) does not apply but the sale would
fall under German national law or under the national law of
any other Contracting States except China, Czech, Slovak or
U.S. law, the Convention will apply. In the cases of these four
states, German courts must apply the rule of these states for
internal sales.
There are still other, more general possibilities of reserva-
tions affecting the sphere of application: countries are allowed
to accept only Parts I, III and IV; or Parts 1, 11 and IV of the
Convention (Article 92). The Scandinavian States have used the
first of these faculties and have, by that, excluded the rules on
formation of the contract. They also declared that the Conven-
tion in its entirety will not be applied to sales where all parties
have their places of business in Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway or Sweden. Such a restriction of geographic sphere of
application is also permitted (Article 90), but only insofar as
19981
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these countries have entered into an agreement that contains
certain provisions on international sales, which seems to be the
case.
These reservations are a little regrettable, but do not mate-
rially weaken the worldwide effectiveness of the UN Sales Con-
vention which represents the greatest realization until now in
the field of international unification of private law.
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